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ABSTRACT

The study of field fortification from the late 17th
century to the mid-19th century indicates that fundamental
principles guided construction techniques and established
a pattern of thinking in fieldwork design.
The applica
tion of these principles were considered important in the
eventual success of the work.
The principles were based
on the achievement of maximum benefit through minimal e f 
fort.
Continual adherence to a plan of efficient action
with least effort in fortification construction was es se n
tial as weapons became more effective and strategies and
tactics more diverse.
The examination of the construction techniques u t i l 
ized in the building of the Civil War defenses around R a 
leigh, North Carolina demonstrate the basic principles
common in fieldwork construction during the 18th and 19th
centuries and provide valuable insight into a relatively
unexplored event in Raleigh's history.

vi i i

INTRODUCTION

Two major goals

in modern archaeological research --

historical reconstruction and delineation of cultural p r o 
cess

-- are often easier to discuss as objectives

ial culture study than to actually achieve
Nonetheless,
Mark Leone

in research.

the well-known works of James Deetz

[1978)

in m a t e r 

(1977)

and

indicate that the task is not impossible.

Each has shown that the study of cultural process
dependent on the utilization of artifacts
mation about the various

is largely

to convey infor

subsystems of a culture.

Hence,

we are able to see how a culture, not just its technology,
proceeds

and changes through time.

between artifacts
the picket

The ongoing interaction

and cultural subsystems, whether it be

fences of the 19th century Mormons

gravestones of 18th century New Englanders,

in Utah or the

conveys knowledge

about the entire culture.
There

is little doubt that technology is of concern in

material culture research.
however,

Its relationship to culture,

has been more directly studied by historians of

technology.
[engineering,

They have examined all aspects of the field
art,

invention)

cern for "how things

but have done so with the c o n 

are done and made"

[Daniels,

quoted

3
from Leone

1978:194).

This approach, while offering v a l u 

able insight into technological processes,

rarely does

little

to aid in our understanding the overall cultural process of
a society.
They are rarely concerned with technology as a social
phenomenon.
They usually deal with complex machines
of the sort produced by the more recent phases of the
Industrial Revolution.
They are, as historians, c o n 
cerned with the particular, not with the comparative
nor the general.
They are not cross-cultural nor, as
historians, are they concerned with applying the goals
of science to the study of technology.
As a consequence,
they have left most technology, including simple m a c h 
ines, outside their domain and thus deprived themselves
of the temporal laboratory in which change could be e x 
amined.
As technological det ermini sts , most historians
of technology have considered technology in and of it 
self, divorced from social and ideological concerns
(Leone 19 78:195) .
In light of these criticisms,
caution.

I approach my thesis with

The preponderance of my- data concerning the e vo lu 

tion of field fortification forces
bent

in its orientation.

a strong technological

Nevertheless,

technical study need

not be relegated solely to the investigation of historical
de v e l op me nt.
Students of material culture recognized that fortifi
cations can be regarded as artifacts and they can thus
be subjected to the same types of analysis which ar t i 
facts have undergone after excavation (Babits 1980:1).
Insight

can be provided by the analysis of the physical

mains of defenses
cerns

re 

as well as the e xaminat ion of those c o n 

shared by the military engineers who constructed them.

The techniques of construction reflect traditional methods
bound by practical concerns.

They allow not only an under-
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standing of "how things are done and made'1 but why "things
are done and made".
While military technology and strategy played major
roles

in determining the technical

cation,

concerns

features of the fo rtifi

for efficiency greatly influenced its a p 

plication at particular sites.
fication construction,

To those who directed f ort i

effective utilization of time, money,

and labor were noted to be of primary importance because
such undertakings

usually involved great monetary costs and

intensification of labor.

Efficiency was not only found to

be an economic imperative but a determinant

in the success

or failure of a defensive work

Brackenbury

(Mahan 1850;

1888).

The concept of efficiency has been discussed theoretically
by several writers

(Skolimowski 1965;

Zipf 1949)

and provides

a good foundation upon which to base a theoretical approach.
Efficiency is of special interest in the study of two
particular fortification sites.
olutionary War defensive works
Pviver in Pennsylvania.
War

The first

includes the R e v 

located along the Delaware

The second site includes the Civil

fortifications built around Raleigh,

While the characteristics

North Carolina.

of these works are largely di c t a 

ted by the nature of the areas to be defended,
many similarities
of those

in charge

in technical

features as well

of their construction.

they share
as concerns

In order to better

understand the association between these two works and the
common principles which guided field fortification construe-
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tion,

it is necessary that they be incorporated in a di s

cussion of four areas:
1)

The evolution of the field fortification from the
late 17th century to the mid-19th century.

2)

Factors

influencing the evolution of the field

fort i fi cat i o n .
3) . Historical background of Raleigh during the Civil
War and the building of R a l e i g h ’s defenses.
4)

Theoretical

concerns and the evaluation of the

defensive measures taken at Raleigh.
A brief discussion of the Philadelphia defenses
two chapters will provide

considerable

in the

first

insight into some of

the basic principles of field fortification construction at
the time of the Revolutionary War.

The subsequent,

in-depth

study and historical reconstruction of the P.aleigh fortifi
cations in chapters three and four will demonstrate the a p 
plication of the same principles some

83 years later.

The historical reconstruction of the Raleigh fortifi
cations requires not only a discussion of the techniques and
principles which guided their construction but an investiga
tion of their influence on the civilian population.

To date,

little research has focused on the defensive measures taken
at Raleigh and that which has been conducted is of que st io n
able accuracy.

Although specific archival

information

available on the fortification network there
real description of them” (habits

1984:1).

is

is "no single
The careful

6
examination of extant documents,

cartographic materials,

existing fortification segments provides valuable
a relatively unexplored,

and

insight into

turbulent period in R a l e i g h ’s history.

CHAPTER I
THE EVOLUTION OF FIELD FORTIFICATION,
17t h - 19th CENTURIES
The pattern of fortification construction practiced
during the second half of the 19th century was a technical
art.

It was an engineering feat based on several hundred

years of experimentation;
ing prehistoric times

and in fact had its origins

(Fagan 1980).

engineer stated a century ago,

dur

As one noted military

"the principle is the same

for the savage as for the most elaborately drilled and armed
soldier of the nineteenth century;

that being,

the taking of

cover from the e n e m y ’s fire” (Brackenbury 1888:2).
the cover consists of a wall of stone,
mound of earth,

Whether

a fallen log, or a

fortifications have been part of warfare

just as warfare has

long been part of human culture.

The passage of time led man beyond the sole .use of
natural barriers

for defense and he was gradually pushed into

the realm of defensive creativity.
typical of Jericho

(10,000 B.P.)

castles of the Middle Ages
impressive structures

The massive stone walls

eventually gave rise to the

(Figure 1).

Castles were very

that proved to be all but impenetrable.

Their thick stone walls were built on elevated terrain and
enclosed secure areas.

This

security encouraged the growth

7

Figure 1. The 12th century

c a s tle of La R oche-Pont,

Fran ce (V io lle t-L e -D u c 1 8 7 6 ).

of villages

and towns within its boundaries.

lems arose, however,

Serious p r o b 

by the close of the 15th century.

in weapon technology enabled attackers

Change

to destroy castle walls

and increased range made the enclosed community highly v u l 
nerable.

New defensive structures were essential.

Engineers began to design fortifications
more extensive

that were much

than the confining defenses of the castle.

These new fortifications were far more elaborate than
the old walls:
they had outworks, salients, bastions,
in spearhead form which permitted both the artillery
and the armed infantry to rake the ranks of the at tac k
ing forces, from whatever side they might approach
(Mumford 1961:358).
V A U B A N fS PERMANENT FORTIFICATIONS
Economy in construction was of concern to those engin 
eers

assigned the task of fortifying cities.

century French engineer,

Sebastien Le Prestre

The noted 17th
de Vauban was

not only influenced by the basic design elements of the 16th
century but was

’’economical of the money of the state” (Viol-

let-Le-Duc 1876:306).

Many of his works

existing fortifications which,
costs and necessary labor.
Pont,

for example,

century

lessened monetary

In fortifying the town of La Roche

he utilized extensively the bastions

structed earlier by Errand
Vauban's

in turn,

incorporated p r e 

co n 

(Figure 2).

defenses were greatly influenced by the 16th

Italian school.

tributed substantially

Vincenzo Scamozzi

(1552-1616)

con

to fortification design and was perhaps

the premier authority on permanent defensive works

at this

Figure 2. The 17th century town of La R oche-Pont
as fortified by Marquis de Vauban
(V io lle t-L e -D u c 1876).
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time.

The works of Scamozzi

and his contemporaries,

however,

were flawed by principles not understood until the 17th c e n 
tury .
What they had not yet grasped was the importance of
outworks, in advance of the main rampart, the de m i 
lunes, ravelins, tenailles and hornworks of which
Vauban made such skillful use [Bloomfield 1971:24).
Vauban took the basic design that had emerged a century
before and elaborated upon it.
plex and the components of his
tinct

[Figure

3).

His designs were more co m 
fortifications were more d i s 

"His great excellence

as an engineer was

shown in the skill with which he adapted the fortifications
he planned to the defensive
[Mercur 1888:46).

requirements of the site..."

Although skillful

in his

approach, he

greatly increased the internal complexity of the work.

This

is seen in the description provided by Clarke:
The geometrical foundation of the Vauban systems was the
bastion trace.
Draw a polygon round the area to be d e 
fended, make of each a bastioned front, obtain saliency
and a cross fire over the front of the ravelins.
This
was the foundation to which Vauban, in his so-called
first system, added little.
Supplement this trace by
any number of cou nt er- gu ar ds; place an independent reduit
in every available angle; build high cavaliers to give
simultaneous lines of fire; retrench everything retrenchable; throwout hornworks, cr ownwo rk s, tenaillons, demitenaillons, to the front, thus indefinitely increasing
geometric possibilities; finally, build a "citadel" in
which most of the above artifices could be repeated i n 
side the mainline, and one arrives at a fair idea of
what may be termed the linear method of fortification
[Clarke 1909:7).
Understanding Vauban's

system can be

facilitated by focusing

on some of the major components which he utilized.
noted element of the Vauban works was

The most

the large earthen mound.

Figure 3. A detail of one of the outworks of the
fortified town of La R o c h e -P o n t
( V io lle t-L e -D u c 1876).
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This was built in front of the main stone wall and constructed
of earth excavated from the ground on its interior side.

The

wall and mound were usually of the same height thus creating
a deep ditch.

The exterior slope of the mound was referred

to as the glacis and varied in the degree of its angle.
main purpose was

to protect the wall

from artillery fire and,

in conjunction with the ditch, make infantry assault
ficult as possible.

Its

as d i f 

A path was usually established between

the base of the inner slope of the mound and the exterior
edge of the ditch.

This path or covered way allowed defend

ing troops

to assemble and quickly retaliate against attack

ing forces.

If not actually engaged in a counter assault,

defenders

could nevertheless occupy

projections of the main wall and ditch combination.
These redans offered the opportunity to bring cross
fire to bear on most points along the circumferanee
of a fortress where attacks might be expected, and
detached strongpoints on the weakest sides of the works,
redoubts, further impaired the enemy's attempt to crack
the defensive perimeter (Rothrock 1968:5).
A good example of Vauban's
was

the defensive works

around the town of Lisle

He began work in 1668 after his
King Louis XIV.
ing walls,
of Vauban.

use of these basic components

designs were

(Figure 4).

approved by

Six thousand laborers spent six years b u i l d 

ditches,

and citadels

--

all to the specifications

By 16 74, he reported that the majority of the

fortress had been completed and that its inhabitants were e n 
gaged in the construction of their dwellings.
nature of the defenses was

The

impressive

in part due to the building complex

,a i**u»i

Figure 4. The 17th century town of Lisle as fortified by Marquis de Vauban
(C la rke 1907).
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on the northwest

side of the fortress.

The citadel was comprised of a pentagon fort with b a s 
tions and the usual detached works, all surrounded by
water; and within the wall a great ’’place", 180 paces
across large barracks, a G o v e r n o r ’s house, a church, an
arsenal, and other details -- the largest and most c o m 
pletely equipped citadel yet built in France (Bloom
field 1971:50).
The fortress

of Lisle was one of several permanent d e 

fensive works that gave Vauban recognition from his colleagues
as well as favor from his king.

His w o r k s , however, have

not been void of recent criticism.

The 19th century French

general Marmont wrote that Vauban "was more of an engineer
than a general,

and in making great numbers of fortresses

he followed the bent of his own predilections"
from Clarke

1909:5).

He was

(Marmont quoted

involved in the construction of

as many as 40 fortresses and all were built on one-third of
F r a n c e ’s frontier.

Although V i o 1let- Le-Due

(18 76) describes

Vauban as economical in the building of his works,
charges that Vauban's
money and certainly

fortifications

Clarke

"entombed vast sums of

leave open to question whether the r e 

sults obtained were proportionate"

(Clarke 1909:5).

He fur-

the r states ,
V a u b a n ’s conception of the use of fortification in re
lation to strategy was by no means justified by its
results; while to the science in its narrower aspect,
he contributed little that was of real value (Clarke
1909 :5) .
Simply stated,
complication
s ivc war fa r e .

it was the opinion of Clarke and others that

in fortification offered no advantage

in defen-

12

FIELD FORTIFICATIONS
While the principles

of the Vauban defenses have been

criticized by some writers,

they nevertheless had an impact

on 18th and 19th century impermanent

field fortification.

In the United States,

for example,

sively on the various

concerns of temporary fortification

construction.

D. H. Mahan wrote e x t e n 

He was a professor of engineering at the United

States Military Academy and his book, A Treatise on Field
Fortification

(1852), was

tary officers

during the second half of the 19th century.

Colonel Charles

a basic manual

C. Brackenbury,

for American m i l i 

R . N . , one of the fore

most English authorities on temporary fortifications, wrote
in a similar manner in his book,

Fieldworks:

Construction and Tactical Application
the various

(1888).

Their Technical
He discusses

components of a we 11-fortified site and the im

portance of each component in its overall

success.

He notes

that the main features of such a site include:
1)

Some kind of cover which exists or can be constructed
artificially, but must not be of such a size and co n
struction as to hinder full view of the enemy.

2)

Such a general shape of the work as will
f1ank at ta c k s .

3)

A citadel of some sort to prevent a partial capture
of the work from being necessarily permanent.

4)

Protection from enfilade

5)

Complete protection for all the garrison not wanted
at the time for fighting purposes.
This is secured
by field casemates, which are generally arranged so
that men can sleep in them (Brackenbury 1888:5).

guard against

fire by means of traverses.
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Brackenbury discusses

in detail these

the 19th century military engineer's

features and recreates
"ideal" of a good field

work .
Construction begins after careful

decisions are made as

to the most advantageous placement of the works.
is often dictated by topography,

Location

intended size of the defenses,

and available construction materials.

The size and extent of

the defenses is dependent on the type of field artillery to
be used by the enemy and the amount of time and manpower a v a i l 
able.

In addition to having a sufficient quantity of labor,

it is necessary to base judgement on the mental and physical
condition of the laborers.

Brackenbury points

tance of these two factors and notes that,
consideration by the commanding officer,
the construction of weak defenses.
as a system,

failure

out the impor

if not taken into

they can result

in

Because the works operate

in one part can lead to failure of the

system as a whole.
The three basic forms which earthworks
closed,

half-closed,

and open.

can take

include

The three shapes are quite

obvious, but they each have specific advantages and disadv an
tages.

Closed works are characterized by thick parapets on

all sides.

These

allow for temporary protection

fire but generally make

counterattack very difficult.

are only used in isolated situations
or reserved works"
only provide

from artillery

[Brackenbury

limited protection

"They

or for flanks of a line

1888:38).

Half-closed works

from enemy artillery and no
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protection from rear attack.

These works are usually depe n

dent on rear artillery and infantry backup.

If captured,

they offer the advantage of allowing o n e ’s own artillery and
infantry to attack from the rear --

the unprotected side.

Open works are the easiest type to construct but offer v i r 
tually no flank protection.

The troops

on the strength of their rear artillery

are very dependent
(Figure 5).

The forms described above are very general and the actual
shape of the fieldwork is dependent
mentioned factors.

largely on the previously

There are, however,

are usually associated with large-scale
struction.

certain factors

fortification co n

A few of these include traverses,

field casemates.

that

parados,

and

Traverses are extended banks of earth and

usually are not connected with parapets at their ends.
extensions

are commonly found in closed works but are also

found with other defenses.

Their purpose

flanks and intercept enemy fire.
traverse

is a parados.

is to protect

feature,

the

One example of a large

It is designed and situated to p r o 

tect the rear of the work during attack from the front.
out this

These

With

it is doubtful that the fieldwork would be

succes s f u l .
The success of the fieldwork is not only dependent on
provisions made

for the protection of the troops

but also on provisions
plays

a vital

for sheltering

inactive troops.

role in battles of long duration.

fatigued troops,

and artillery
Rest

To accomodate

field casemates are often constructed

(Figure 6).
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While these bombproof covers
are usually built

can serve their purpose,

in limited numbers.

they

They are an ela b o r a 

tion of the shelter trench and require a great deal of time
and labor to adequately construct.

Brackenbury states

that

"it is well to think twice or thrice before occupying a de 
fensive position which needs

to be so strengthened,

may carry with its fall the capture of the whole

and which

army”

(Brackenbury 1888:39).
Another important

aspect of the successful

is the use of obstacles.

fortification

These vary in degree of effe cti ve

ness but all are intended to slow the advance of the enemy.
Prior to laying obstacles,

it is necessary

territory around the defenses as possible.

to clear as much
This includes all

types of foliage that could be used as cover by the attacker.
Obstacles

are then laid out,

often in a concentrated manner.

Those commonly used include che ve aux-de-frises, fraises,
and palisades

(Figure

7).

Cheveaux-de-frises

spikes that are driven through a beam.
of available
rier.

timber,

fication ditch.
vents

are pointed

Often constructed out

these spikes present

They are generally placed well

abatis,

a formidable b a r 

in front of the forti

The ditch is usually v-shaped and thus p r e 

the congregation of enemy troops below the line of fire.

As an additional obstacle,

an abatis is usually added.

This

is usually a small tree that contains a protrusion of sharp
ened branches.
posts

Fraises are also sharpened spikes or small

that are set in the bottom of a frontal trench.

In
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addition to the base of the trench,
horizontally into the rampart.

they may also be set

If time allows,

a series of

sharpened posts

can be placed along the interior of the

fortification.

The resulting palisade provides a good o b 

stacle to infantry assault but

is time consuming in its

con str uc ti on.
The obstacles

and features that have been described are

often directly associated with closed or half-closed works.
They may also be associated with
shelter trenches

(rifle pits).

Brackenbury has knowledge,

less complex works known as
Of all the fieldworks

of which

he favors the shelter trench.

It

can be constructed in a short period of time and yet be very
effective

(Figure

8).

It is not intended to be an obstacle 'in itself.
Shelter
trenches should begin with the shortest unit of time
allowed to construct the minimum of cover, and be then
developed, if required, through the forms of more p r o 
tective shelter trenches up to that of the field parapet
with its ditch (Brackenbury 1888:30).
In addition to the obvious advantage of constructing this
simple

fieldwork is the disadvantage

it gives to the enemy.

It has no frontal ditch which can offer quick refuge to an
attacker and thus eliminates the need for flank defense.
The simple trench shelter offers another distinct
vantage

ad 

in that a line of '’communication” can be established.

This term refers to the presence of an exit within the works
that will allow a hasty retreat or a rapid counterattack.
Brackenbury states that :
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the whole intention of fortification, as of tactics and
other branches of the art of war, is not so much to kill
numbers of the enemy while saving our own side, as to
produce the greatest effect of moral depression on the
survivors of the enemy and put our own troops in the
highest spirits.
A long continuous defense will never
do this (Brackenbury 1888:6).
Brackenbury states that allowing proper communication is
essential "because the tendency of all works,

whether field

or permanent,

is to teach habits of inactivity which can soon

become

(Brackenbury 1888:6).

fatal"

If simplicity succumbs

to elaboration and such components are neglected,
success of the fieldwork will be in question.
being led into the expenditure

then the

"Beware of

of too much time and energy"

(Brackenbury 1888:32).
THE AMERICAN DEFENSES OF PHILADELPHIA
The technical aspects of 19th century fieldworks were
of advanced engineering design that offered great advantage
in defensive warfare.
works was

the success of the

contingent on the satisfaction of certain design

requirements.
ments

As mentioned above,

It is interesting to note that these require

did not emerge

during the second half of the

tury but were known to military engineers
tionary War.

Evidence of such knowledge

work of Worthington C. Ford.
delphia in 1777

(1897),

His book,

19th ce n 

during the R ev olu
is best

seen in the

Defenses of Phila 

is a compilation of documents that

provide a record of the Councils of War held by Washington.
These

documents

which concerns

contain war-related information;

part of

the building of defenses around Philadelphia.
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On May 31, 1777, Washington wrote to Governor Patrick
Henry of the expected sailing of a large fleet of the
enemy -- estimated at a hundred sail -- from New York.
What General H o w e ’s immediate object was could only be
conjectured; but it is believed that he had one of two
purposes:
either to possess the Hudson River or to a t 
tack Philadelphia by way of the Delaware (Ford 19 71:1).
Washington suspected that Howe's
phia.

aim was to attack Ph il adel 

He therefore solicited advice

from his general o f f i 

cers on how best to fortify the city.
Suggestions

for the defense of the city focused primarily

on the building of fortifications at strategic points along
the Delaware River or strengthening those already
at these
by's

locations.

Creek,

These points

Red Bank,

in existence

included Bi 1 lin gs po rt , Der

and Fort Island

(Figure 9).

and opinions on the vulnerability of these

Comments

locations was the

main content of those responses sent to General Washington.
There was also correspondence between generals
to the preparations necessary at these

locations.

important in that they contain significant
American and British fieldworks.
example, wrote

Colonel

in reference
These are

comments on both

General W a s h i n g t o n , for

Christopher Green:

Sir,
I am led to believe from the conversation I have had
with Lieutenant Colonel Green, that you have made Fort
Mercer impregnable against an assault; and that nothing
is to be feared but from regular approaches and shells
-- to guard against the first, it would be found n ec es 
sary to have some out works, which time may, possibly
allow you raise -- to secure the garrison against the
second, some Bombproofs (casemates) should be constructed
-- The first you can easily do, but how far the other
is practicable I know not, for want of competent k n o w 
ledge of the place -- its extent -- I would suggest to
you, however, by way of quaere, whether caverns could

PENNSYLVANIA
NEW JERSEY
Billingsport

.C arpenters
Is la n d
P ro vin ce
^ Is la n d

\

S c h u y lk ill
\ R iv e r

Fort 'x
1 M ifflin

B ed •

Bank
Key
X — C h e v a u x -d e -fris e
O — T id a l M a rs h
• — Town

P h ila d e lp h ia
D elaw are R iv e r
C ooper’s F erry
(C a m d e n )

Figure 9. Location of major American fortified positions on the Delaware River.
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not be cut out of the Bank below the work, and s u p 
ported (the earth) by Pillars, would not be the q ui ck 
est, and most effectual method -- If this should bo
found to answer, all your men, in case of a Bombardment,
might be concealed in them, except such as should be
necessary for guards (Washington quoted from Ford
1971 :81) .
Washington's brief description of Fort Mercer is supplemented
by a reference to a fort on H o g ’s Island.

Du Coudray, W a s h 

i n g t o n ’s engineer in charge of the defenses of Philadelphia,
states that
the fort where this battery lies is very bad, being i n 
closed, only on two fronts, byo one palisade with bad
loopholes, and very ill flanked; but as the enemy can
Land there, only with chaloupes, it may Resist Long
time, even in this weak situation, with six or seven
hundred men to guard i t ; specialy if the army was not
far off (Du Coudray quoted from Ford 1971:16).
In addition to having an understanding of structural
design within the interior of the defenses,
knowledge of numerous obstacles that

officers had

could hinder an assault.

An American officer stated that
The Enemy have enlarged the upper battery opposite the
Fort, we this morning discover 5 Embrasures, masked as
yet with Fascines -- it is probable that they will open
at once -- their prospect seems to be, to knock down
our palisades, and storm our west front between the two
block houses.
To cover our palisades on this side we
have applied to General Varnum to furnish us with fas
cines, which we shall place on the Summit of the bank
to serve instead of earth, which is not to be had -- I
don't know whether we shall be able to procure the F a s 
cines (Journal quoted from Ford 1971:99).
Palisades we re popular obstacles but officers also noted the
use of pickets,

abatis,

and cheveaux -d e-fri ses.

The chcvcaux-

de-frises were not only used as obstacles on land but placed
across

shallow rivers.

They temporarily blocked the passage
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of ships and hindered the major means of transporting troops,
ammunition,

and provisions.

Obstacles were but a part of a complex pattern utilized
during the Revolutionary War.

Both British and American e n 

gineers were not only aware of the function of the various
fortification components but were concerned with the most
efficient use of labor and time.

Many of the officers

dir ect 

ly questioned the practicality of building and strengthening
certain defenses.

There was a prevailing attitude of caution

throughout the correspondence against the unnecessary use of
money,

time, and labor

(Ford 1971).

Continental Army had none to spare.
spoken proponents
Greene.

The

Congress and the

One of the most o u t 

of such a policy was Major General Nathaniel

In his reply to General Washington,

he stated that

he was against extensive development of any fortifications
at any of the strategic points
plete

such works

along the Delaware.

(at just one of the

location)

To com

would require

the labor of a large number of troops, not to mention the
number needed to garrison the works.
of at least

Me estimated the need

1200 men at Billingsport alone and stated that

there have been prodigous sums of money expended at that
place and people have taught to expect great security
from its strength.
To abandon it at this time might
alarm their fears, and give the dis'posed a handle to
censure the leaders of the people for subjecting the
Continent to such fruitless and unnecessary expense.
Although these reasons urge strongly for holding the
work, yet those that offer themselves for abandoning it,
operate more forcibly with me (Greene quoted from Ford
1971:8).
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He noted that the present works at Billingsport
major features
tion.

lacked two

-- casemates and a proper line of communica

The fort would last a very short time

siege and it would be difficult,
garrison to retreat.

if it came under

if not impossible,

for the

Similar problems existed at Red Bank

and D e r b y ’s Creek.
Greene favored the type of fortification advocated by
Brackenbury a century later.

He proposed that

simple trenches

be dug for use by infantry and half-moon parapets be thrown up
for artillery.

The advantage to such defenses was that they

could be quickly constructed at various points and would r e 
quire

limited troops.

These defenses

could be easily abandon

ed and would in turn be of little strategic value
If extensive

fieldworks were

tured by the enemy,

grave

constructed,

consequences

if captured.

and eventually cap

could result.

The well-

armed British could easily supply these works with cannon.
Greene

conceded that all forts along the Delaware would ev e n t 

ually fall under British siege.

He concluded that

!'the coun

try cannot be c o n q u e r ’d and held in subjection but by g a r 
risons;

it should be our policy, therefore, to have as few

as may be"

[Greene quoted from Ford 1971:11).

CHAPTER II
THE IMPACT OF WEAPON TECHNOLOGY AND WARFARE STRATEGY
ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF FIELD FORTIFICATION
The engineering principles which guided field fortifica
tion construction during the 18th and 19th centuries were the
contributions of a number of early engineers, Vauban having
been the most celebrated.
table

These principles have an irrefu

link to weapon technology and warfare

(1909:6)

strategy.

Clarke

states that

fortification and tactics have but one and the same b a 
sis in all ages, and that is the power, in the widest
possible sense, of the weapons of the attack and defense.
The only scientific fortification is that which enables
the defender to use his weapons to the best advantage,
while minimizing the potency of the weapons of the a t 
tacker .
SEVENTEENTH CENTURY WEAPON TECHNOLOGY
As discussed earlier,

the 17th century fortresses of

France had a number of complex geometrical elements

incor

porating ■massive earthen walls and extensive ditches.

Con

trary to the

their

criticisms

validity is somewhat

lodged against these defenses,

restored when one reviews the nature of

17th century warfare.
Benjamin Franklin suggested to Charles
dated February

11,

Lee,

in a letter

1776, that

pikes could be introduced and I would add bows and arrows.
These were good weapons, not wisely laid aside;
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1st Because a man may shoot as truly with a bow as with
a common musket.
2ndly He can discharge four arrows in the time of char 
ging and discharging one bullet.
3rdly Mis object is not taken from his view by the smoke
of his own s i d e .
4thly A flight of arrows, seen coming upon them, te rr i
fies and disturbs the e n e m i e s ’ attention to their b u s i 
ness.
Sthly An arrow striking in any part of a man puts him
"hors de combat" till it is extracted.
6thly Bows and arrows are more easily provided e v e r y 
where than muskets and ammunition (Franklin quoted from
Esper 1965 :382).
It is interesting and perhaps
to this correspondence,

ironic that two centuries prior

the firearm had replaced the

and by the 17th century it had become
the principal military weapon.

longbow

firmly established as

The irony of this situation

can be understood by examining the inadequacies of the w e a 
pons and the difficulties

it placed on offensive warfare.

The major firearm of the first half of the 17th century
was the matchlock musket.

Although Neuman

(1967)

use of the flintlock as early as 1550 in Europe,

notes the
the m a t c h 

lock was considered by the soldier to be more reliable.

This

preference required the acceptance of many inconveniences.
These consisted of:
(1)
(2)

(3)

protecting the weapon (powder) from moisture;
keeping matches burning in the presence of an enemy
and thus, often betraying position by light, smoke,
and odor;
poor range (100 to 200 paces) and slow loading
meant that fire could be maintained only by a deep
formation -- six men deep, more or less (Spaulding,
Nickerson, and Wright 1925:497).

Likewise,

artillery weapons of this period presented

major logistical problems as well as serious hazards.

It was

not unusual for a battery of ten, 24-pounders to require as
much as twelve tons of shot and six tons of powder for one
d a y ’s operation.

Transporting large quantities of munitions

with relatively few guns
such weapons

lessened the advantage

for use on the battlefield.

of having

The imposing dangers

of artillery also hindered its effective use.

The often poor

quality of the powder and its slow burning would "more often
than not leave smoldering powder in the gun after the round
had been fired.

Before reloading it was

out the gun thoroughly,
occurence

imperative to swab

lest the next charge pre-ignite,

an

frequently fatal for gunners” (Rothrock 1968:5).

The smoldering powder also tended to glaze the barrel of the
weapon thus making the bore diameter uneven.

Balls were not

fired smoothly greatly decreasing their range and accuracy.
A great deal of the
the use of weapons that
for their acceptance.

17th century was characterized by
lead one to question the reasoning

They were generally unreliable,

da n

gerous to the user, and often dependent on acceptable weather.
Such complications were not characteristic of the

longbow.

The superiority of this weapon over the firearm was reco g
nized by many individuals well into the

18th century.

Most

critics wrote extensively during the period of its replace
ment by the firearm.

Sir John Smythe

(1590)

was typical of

those who pointed out the many shortcomings of the new weap-
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on.

To counter this wave of criticism,

some of the advantages of the firearm.
for example,
men,

stated that

advocates pointed out
Sir Roger Williams,

"munition that belongs unto the bow

are not so commonly found in all places,

arrows,

as powder is unto other shot"

especially

[quoted from Esper

1965:386) .
The replacement of the

longbow in the English army lias

been recently studied by Thomas Esper

(1965).

He concluded

that the replacement was due to a number of factors not n e c 
essarily

limited to the military establishment.

understanding one of the principal
statement

reasons

The key to

is found in the

of the 16th century writer Humfrey Barwick.

states that
dozen arrows

He

"any qualified archer was expected to shoot a
in one minute at a man-sized target two hundred

and forty yards away -- and hit it with all twelve"
from Esper 1965:388).

While

(quoted

somewhat exaggerating his point,

he nevertheless uses the term "qualified".

The majority of

17th century English soldiers were not trained in archery.
The onetime national sport had declined in popularity and
given way to "unlawful games".

In essence,

the average

soldier lacked the years of experience necessary to be a good
archer.
If one considers the manner in which armies were raised
in E l i z a b e t h ’s reign, when quite often vagabonds and
the most wretched were pressed into service, it is
understandable that the soldiers were generally poor
archers and their weapons, poorly used, inferior to
firearms (Esper 1965:391).
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WARFARE STRATEGY IN THE 17th CENTURY
The weapon technology of the 17th century greatly in
fluenced the warfare strategy of the period.

The inadequa

cies of the firearm and logistical problems of the artillery
were

coupled with armies that

could not be easily mobilized.

More time was spent maneuvering armies
tions than was actually spent

into favorable p o s i 

in battle.

Field battles were usually a matter of tacit agreement
between opposing commanders to essay a trial of force
where each thought he saw a margin of victory, unless
one's forces had -- as only rarely happened -- attained
a position that forced the enemy to defend against an
advance at any cost (Rothrock 1968:8) .
Commanders

could literally not afford to be reckless in their

engagements.
munitions

Troop replacements

in the field were

few and

slow in coming.

Armies often maintained a series of fortified cities
under their control.

Their massive

defensive enclosures

offered a safe haven for beleaguered troops and the viable
economy of the city usually allowed quick resupply of needed
materials.

Extended occupation usually led to siege warfare

by the enemy.

This was the preferred type of engagement by

opposing forces,

each believing that their position held

special advantage.

"To Louis XIV, to his war minister

Louvois,

and to his chief engineer Vauban, war of position appealed
with special

fascination"

(Rothrock

1968:10).

This was

in

part due to the prevailing cautious attitude of military
leaders and their failure to commit their forces to battle
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on the open field.

This

fascination was also the result of

the obvious advantages of the 17th century fortress.
infantry assault was rarely attempted.

Direct

The only means by

which a fortress

could be taken was through the construction

of siege

A special engineering feat

lines.

in itself,

lines enabled both artillery and infantry to achieve
positions

to the defenses.

such

closer

Vauban, noted for his contribu

tions to defensive warfare, had extensive knowledge of such
operations.

He warned repeatly that siege

lines exposed the

vulnerability of defenses and that no fortress !Tcould ever be
designed that would be impregnable to a determined and wellsupplied enemy"

(Rothrock

1968:10).

THE EMERGENCE OF THE FIELD FORTIFICATION
The end of the 17th century was

characterized by certain

changes in military organization that were to have a profound
influence

on 18th century warfare.

increased number of professional

These changes

included an

soldiers and greater struc-

turalization within the military establishment.

The once

large, uncontrolled mass of infantry was refined into precise
units and characterized by rigid formality.

It was recog 

nized that,

on the open field,

if infantry were to be effective

organization was essential.

This was

influenced by the t a c 

tics of war at the turn of the century.
long known that

Military leaders had

"maximum fire power was the desideratum; with

the weapons of the day the dense

line was the formation that

gave i t ; a new system of command to handle

it could not be
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improvised; hence
Wright

"linear tactics"

1925:531).

(Spaulding, Nickerson,

Such tactics had one major principle

and

and

that was for each soldier to maintain the "line".

This b a t 

tle formation required not only rapid deployment

from the line

of march but a great deal of discipline under fire.
Better organization and new tactics were
"led to the extended use of fortified lines

conditions which

-- not only chains

of fortresses like Vauban's, but systems of field entrenchments
to cover a whole province:
1925:532).

(Spaulding,

Nickerson,

and Wright

They usually connected a series of fortified posts

and were often themselves protected by barriers
into their design.

The French

(1702),

incorporated

for example,

used water

inundation to protect their lines along the Dutch frontier.
Similar barriers were used in building extensive works

in the

upper Rhine Valley during the fist decade of the century.
"LINEAR" TACTICS, TRADITIONALISM, AND THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE
Although the advantages
realized during the
concerns

of good field fortification were

first half of the

18th century,

tactical

continued to be influenced by offensive warfare.

The

"linear" method retained its popularity, although adjustments
were required to lessen the defender's advantage.
the deadly effects of vollies
regular

To counter

fired from fortified positions,

infantry depended on an advanced guard of skirmishers.

These troops did not proceed in line
a dispersed manner.

formation but rather in

They engaged the enemy and allowed wing

formations of the regular troops to assume

flank positions.

Reserve mounted troops often followed the rapid advance of

regular infantry and exploited the broken ranks of the enemy's
formation.

This was

facilitated by massing artillery

assault and, prior to the arrival of cavalry,
enemy with caseshot

(Falls

for the

blasting the

1961).

The true advantage of defending a we 11-fortified site
was perhaps not fully appreciated because of the continued
limitations of the firearm.

Improvements

such as the flint

lock over the wheellock and earlier matchlock did little to
increase

range or rate of fire.

The rifled musket

totally rectify these inadequacies.

could not

It was plagued by an

"even slower rate of fire than the smoothbore and was more
fragile.

Armies, therefore,

rejected rifles for general use

and issued them only to a few specialists units"
Eighteenth century firearms

(Ross

1979:24)

and tactics each contributed

to the perpetuation of military tradition on the European
battlefield.

Flexibility and elasticity had become

acceptable

in tactical maneuvers but officers

continued to engage

battle

This tactic had been largely

utilizing

line formations.

in

confined to Europe and had not been adequately tested on d i s 
tant battlefields.

One such example

of its use was in the

1755 expedition of General Edward Braddock
According to Spaulding, Nickerson,

in the United States

and Wright

(1925:569)

the general's experience had been in European wars of
the Marlborough type, and he could not see that in the
Indians he had to meet anything more serious than Eu r o 
pean light troops, which were helpless against a line
of battle.
Mis dispositions when nearing Fort Dusquesne
showed no lack of caution or skill.
There was no distant
reconnaissance but there was a proper use of advanced
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guard and flanking parties.
The enemy was discovered
in plenty of time, and the advanced guard, commanded
oy Colonel Thomas Gage, formed line and repulsed the
first attack handsomely.
But the Indians spread around
the flanks and commenced a steady individual fire.
The
troops showed discipline and steadiness, but could find
nothing to attack.
The expedition ended in utter d i s 
aster.
The British experience
with the

in the United States did not end

Indian wars but rather was continued in the American

Revolution.

This conflict brought together opposing forces

which differed greatly in the number and quality of troops.
The superior number of British land forces were wel l -o rg an 
ized, disciplined,
adequate weapons

and backed by a large navy.

and munitions,

Supplied with

British commanders had no

reason to alter the tactics to which they were accustomed.
They were no longer fighting the Indians but rather the A m e r 
icans and the French.

It was not surprising that their enemy,

likewise, was pressed by tradition to engage

in the tactics

of war suitable to Europeans.
It was soon recognized by the Americans that victory
over the British
methods.

could not be achieved by traditional warfare

Linear tactics

favored those who were superior in

number, we 11-t r a i n e d , and better equipped.
tions and individual
American army.

fire became

Thus,

important tactics

fortifica
in the

Strong defensive positions reduced the ad v a n 

tage given to a superior number of enemy but could only do so
for a limited period of time.
Indefinite occupation of fortified positions was

impos-
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sible.

A good example of this principle was

American occupation of Philadelphia's

seen in the

defenses.

Several

of these fortifications were originally constructed by the
British prior to the Revolution.

In 1771, a sum of 15,0 00

pounds was granted for the defense of the city by the P e n n 
sylvania Assembly.

A portion of this money was used to p u r 

chase a small island located approximately eight miles down
the Delaware River.

British Captain of Engineers John Mont-

resor supervised militia and civilian laborers
struction of a large redoubt on this island.
later,

Penn noted in his January 20,

in the co n
Three years

1774 address to the

Assembly that
you will, on Enquiry, find that the work, so far as it
has been executed, is done in a masterly Manner; and
that Materials to a considerable Value are on the Spot,
ready to continue it as soon as the season will admit
(Penn quoted from the Pennsylvania Archives 1935:7079).
Following Penn's assessment of the defenses, he provided a
partial

itemization of expenses entailed from fortification

construction.
payment

Numerous workmen are noted as having received

for their labor on the defenses.

made to some individuals,

While payments were

Penn states that attention

is being

directed as to "how much is yet in Arrear to the workmen"
(Penn quoted from the Pennsylvania Archives

1935:7079).

The defenses of Fort Island fell into the hands of the
Pennsylvania militia

in 1 775.

Extensive

improvemei. ts were

carried out and
the completed fortification, called fort Mifflin, c o v 
ered the southern tip of the Island, which was little
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more than an easily-flooded mud flat.
The fort had
stone walls on the south and east sides, and log pallisades and earthen embankments enclosed the rest of
it (Lender 1979:14).
In refurbishing this fortification and other defensive works,
the Americans also utilized civilian labor.
able to many of Washington's engineers.

This was

favo r

His chief engineer,

in reference to the defense work at 3 i 11i n g sp ort, stated that
if the Government intend to unite all their efforts in
finishing this fort,
I would propose to hire instead of
militiamen, workment
by the day, which after exact ca l
culation of all expenses, will cost incomparably less,
I believe, will work a great deal more, give far less
trouble to those who conduct the works, and not consume
such an immense quantity of tools of all kinds (Du
Coudray quoted from Ford 1971:44).
The strengthening of the defenses on Fort Island and
Billingsport were obvious

attempts to deny the British a major

means of access to Philadelphia.

Members of W a s h i n g t o n ’s

Council of War were convinced that the city would be attacked
by the British Navy; probably by siege.

If the British could

not be stopped down river, then American control of the city
would be lost.
river defenses
approaches.
of General

American forces had become dispersed along the
and were not

Consequently,

in position to defend landward
on September 26,

1777, the

forces

Charles Cornwallis approached the city by land

and took possession unopposed.

American strategy then turned

towards holding the river defenses and preventing British
supply ships from reaching port.

Superior British

firepower

placed the defenses under heavy siege and the works were
gradually abandoned.

On November

15th,

Fort Mifflin was

taken and by the 2 3rd Washington conceded in a letter to
Congress that

"the enemy are now in possession of all the

water defenses"

(Washington quoted from Oberholtzer

1912:269).

The abandonment of the defenses was the result of the
inability of the Americans to maintain a continuous defense
under siege.

This action was a reflection of the limited

value of fortified sites under certain conditions.
however,

conditions allowed for great

abandonment of Fort Mercer on November

success.
30th,

Sometimes,

Prior to the

its garrison

defeated a large number

of Hessian troops.

launched against a fort

that was deceptive in its appearance.

The

Their attack was

first enemy column crossed the abandoned outworks "and

unconscious that they had been designedly abandoned,
thought

they

in the excitement of the first surprise that the e n 

tire fort was their own"

(Stryker 1901:18).

Remaining Hessian

forces approached the defensive works and it was then that
the garrison,
fire.

concealed within the inner entrenchments,

The impact of the fire from the

mainline was tremendous

opened

loopholes along the

and angles created by the defenses

allowed devasting crossfire on the

Hessian

flank.

The d e 

feated Hessian forces suffered a large number of casualties,
including the officer who claimed that he would take the fort
with no mercy for its defenders.
WiiAPON TECHNOLOGY AND WARFARE STRATEGY IN THE AMERICAN CIVIL
WAR
The developments
a profound

in 19th century weapon technology had

influence on the extensive use of fortification
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during the Civil War.

Its impact

can be seen not only in

the variety of firearms and artillery produced by domestic
and foreign contractors,
proved the weapons

but by certain shared features which

superior to those of earlier periods.

Perhaps the most

important

was the rifling of firearms.
to special troops

feature to gain acceptance

Rifled muskets had been issued

during the Revolution but were not a c cept 

able for standard issue.

The popular smoothbore musket

con

tinued into the 19th century and was the principal shoulder
weapon stocked in Federal arsenals by mid-century.
the early months

During

of the Civil War, the smoothbore was one of

several ’’obsolete weapons

called back into service.

was true even with flintlocks,

especially

This

in some Confederate

un its” (Lord 1965:242).
The rifle became an effective infantry weapon after the
development of the modern bullet, a conical projectile
with a hollow or brass base which expands to take the
grooves in the barrel.
The percussion cap was an i m 
provement over the flintlock.
Breech-loading increased
the rate of fire and made it possible to load from a
prone or running position.
The muzzle loader hung on for
a time because it was easier to manufacture and existing
stocks of muskets could be converted into rifles, but
all of these inventions eventually enabled the infantry
to deliver more fire at longer ranges.
This out-moded
Napoleonic artillery tactics, which had smashed at the
enemy's tight formations with case shot (which had the
same effect as later shrapnel) from outside musket range
(Ropp 1962 :162) .
Advances
ments

in 19th century artillery owed much to develop

introduced in earlier periods.

loading was

For example, breech-

introduced as early as the 15th century and straight

grooved rifling in the 16th century.

Breech-loading artillery
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pieces were used to a limited extent by Federal and Con fe d
erate

forces during the war.

Ordinance officers,

tended to prefer the use of the muzzle loaders.
erence

continued throughout the

readily accepted but,

This p r e f 

19th century despite the

benefits offered from such an innovation.
was more

however,

Rifling of cannon

as in the shoulder weapon,

not universal until the second half of the

19th century.

was
Many

smoothbore pieces were used throughout the war, especially by
the Confederates.
was that

A disadvantage

in using the rifled piece

it had

to be served more carefully than the smoothbore.
Rifling
grooves were cleaned with a moist sponge, and sometimes
oiled with another sponge.
Lead-coated projectiles like
the James, whicli tended to foul the grooves of the piece,
made it necessary to scrape the rifle grooves after every
half dozen shots, although guns using brass-banded p r o 
jectiles did not require the extra operation (Lord 1965:24).
In addition to rifling artillery with twisted grooves,
several other advances were made which increased the range
and accuracy of the cannon.

Falls notes that

their transformation was due to rapid and continuous
improvement in a number of respects.
The gun itself,
instead of being cast, was made of wrought iron bands
from the tunnions (the projections which rested on the
carriage) to the breech.
With stouter guns more
powerful propellants could be employed, and by 1861
one was available in the form of nitroglycerine.
The
other type of explosive used by artillery, the charge
in the shell, was also increased in violence (Falls
1961:6 4).
These developments had a major impact on the tactics of war
practiced during the mid-19th century.
In addition to the advances

in weapon technology,

sev-
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eral other factors

influenced the tactics or strategies of

war adopted by the Confederate and Federal armies.
tradition,

Military

for example, was maintained by the leading o f f i 

cers of the opposing armies.

Many were graduates of West

Point and their training based on French tactics
the previous

century.

Ross

[1979)

and Ropp

adopted in

(1962) have noted

not only the popularity of French drill in the United States
army but also of French tactics of troop deployment
field.

in the

The frontal assault of strategic areas was the p r i n 

cipal means of attack recognized by commanders
first half of the war.

It

was not until

shift in tactics took place.

Wave

during the

1863 that a major

after wave of attacking

infantry was no longer an effective maneuver in the field.
More often than not,
"The skirmishing

such Napoleonic tactics proved fatal.

formation was now the normal tactical order"

(Ropp 1962:162).

This was in part due to the increased

utilization and availablity of more effective weapons
basic differences
The
war.

in the opposing armies.

Confederate

forces essentially fought a defensive

"Because they could not hope to conquer the Northern

States,

their problem was to resist

to tire the Federals out,
(Fuller 1961:101) .
erates

and

conquest.

In other words,

and force them to abandon the war"

In order to accomplish this,

the Co nf ed 

depended a great deal on strong fortified positions.

Successful attack against
superiority

such positions usually required a

in troops of 3 to 1.

This

lessened the advantage
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given to the superior number of Federal
the extensive use of defensive works

forces.

Eventually,

characterized both sides

and ended the traditional tactics of assault.

The skirmish

formation was adopted on a large scale and had implications
far beyond its restrictive use on the battlefield.

Loose-

knit raiding parties attacked the economic base of the
federacy.

Con

Gradual destruction and capture of numerous port

and railroad facilities shook the foundation upon which the
South rested.

The tactical

advantage of maintaining defe n

sive position could not continue

indefinitely;

severed from the economic centers of resupply.

especially if

CHAPTER III

THE RALEIGH FORTIFICATIONS
In order to adequately study the Confederate
cations of Raleigh,

North Carolina,

vestigate the circumstances

fortifi

it is necessary to in 

leading to their construction.

The task can best be accomplished by '’recreating" Raleigh
during the early

1860s and focusing on its role as a Con

federate capital during the Civil War.

The

investigation

is facilitated by documentary evidence which describes the
conditions in P.aleigh during the war and provides

insight

into the defensive measures taken to protect the city.
ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS
Throughout the Civil War years, North Carolina and its
capital played an important
army with the various
Raleigh,

role in supplying the

Confederate

goods and services demanded by war.

like the capitals of the other southern states, was

the primary economic and administrative center that maintained
the state as a productive member of the Confederate States of
America.

Raleigh was surrounded by various mills,

virtually

all of which produced goods needed in the war effort.
such mill, W h i t a k e r ’s Mill, was
had been

in operation since

located on Crabtree

its construction
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One

Creek and

in 1777.

Dur
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ing the war it was primarily used in producing black powder.
This was sold to the Confederate government for $1.75 a pound.
Another important mill,

known at various times

duction of lumber, wheat,
It was

for its p r o 

and wool carding, was Yates Mill.

located on Yates Pond,

south of Raleigh.

At Raleigh and Fayetteville were paper mills; and there
were thirty-nine cotton factories and seven wollen mills.
These made yarn and cloth, and throughout the state, hand
looms and spinning jennys came into use by those who
could obtain them.
Wooden shoes, pikes, caps, and powder
were also made at Raleigh (Ashe 192 5:65) .
Governor Vance encouraged home manufacture of everything that
was needed for the war.

He made sure that all North

troops were well supplied with clothing,
"The

Confederacy,

shoes,

on one or two occasions,

Carolina

and blankets.

drew on the depot

at Raleigh for clothing for other t ro ops” (Curry 1900:81).
Throughout the war, Vance made

available to the soldiers of

other states quantities of shoes, blankets,

and clothing.

Along with the many industrial sites that were

located

just outside the town and important businesses within,

one

cannot overlook the importance of the railroad system.
important railroads

Two

connected with Raleigh in 1861 and the

same extensions exist today;

only the names have changed.

From 1861 to 1865, the North

Carolina Railroad connected

Raleigh with the towns of Greensboro,
parts of the state

(Figure

10).

Goldsboro,

and other

By 1896, the railroad system

had been renamed as Southern Railroad and is called the same
today.

The Weldon and Gaston Railroad also connected with

...

o^
•o

-C
o»

go
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Raleigh during the war years.
south and continued,
for some distance,

It entered the town from the

parallel to the North Carolina Railroad

in a northeasterly direction.

After the

war, the railroad was renamed as the Raleigh and Gaston R a i l 
road.

The same extension is known today as the Seaboard

Coast

Line.

It is interesting to note that so few changes

have taken place since the Civil War in the railroad systems
connecting directly with the capital.

It is important h i s 

torically with regard to the strategic location of a section
of fortifications

constructed around Raleigh.
C>

The railroads were the most efficient means of tr a n s 
porting

large numbers of soldiers and vital supplies to C on

federate troops.

Without this network,

been an asset to the southern cause.

Raleigh would not have

The railroads not only

carried soldiers and supplies out but wounded in.
was the site of the state's
pital.

first

Raleigh

Confederate military h o s 

Approximately three different hospitals were e st ab 

lished in Raleigh during the war.

One hospital was

in the newly constructed buildings of Peace
known today as Peace College,
ern part of the town not
and Gaston Railroad.

which was

located

Institute

(1863),

located in the no r t h 

far from the tracks of the Weldon

A second military hospital was e s t a b 

lished west of town in the area that is today occupied by the
state

farigrounds.

The third hospital was of less importance

than the previous two and was
By the end of 1862,

located in southeast

Raleigh.

the citizens of Raleigh were making
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virtually every effort to carry their share of the burden of
the war.

They were encouraged to conserve what

little was

available and to do without those things that were not ab s o 
lutely necessary.
ficult task.

As the war dragged on, this was not a d i f 

Prices skyrocketed and people were

vive only on the essentials.
leigh attempted to provide
poverished citizens.
bitant

left to s u r 

The Ladies Aid Society of R a 

relief for a great number of im

Its efforts were hindered by the e x o r 

costs of many items.

A treasurer's

account with the

Ladies Aid Society list the purchase of the following items:
Raleigh, N.C.

1864 March

Calico sold for $30 a yard;
a white straw hat for $20;

13 100 lbs Sugar $20 lb $2000.00
1 Keg Lard 84 lbs $10 lb $840.00
1 lb Tea $150.00 (Coker 1966).

a pair of cotton socks

and a bushel of meal for $25.

Adding to their economic difficulties,
to make

for $10;

citizens were asked

food contributions to military training camps outside

of town.
As the war progressed,
selves

Federal

felt by raiding towns not

soldiers also made t h e m 

far from the capital.

such raid took place at Rocky Mount on July 29,

1863.

One
The

Battle's

Cotton Factory was burned and storehouses were d e s 

troyed.

The governor and the citizens of Raleigh realized

that the capital could be a prime target for a raid by

Fed

eral cavalry.
Cavalry raids are getting to be serious things to the
people of the Confederacy -- especially to the quiet
inhabitants of this goodly city, who don't know whether
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they will be permitted to sleep in their own beds t o 
night.
The raid on the IV and W Railroad, at Warsaw has
put our people to thinking, and, we hope, to acting a l 
so.
There is no way to protect the country against
these raids but to put every man able to bear arms on
a war footing.
Hence we hope that the legislature will
pass at once, the "Raid Bill", or something like it,
by which every white male person, physically able to
handle a gun, from 16 to 50 or 60, may be enrolled and
kept ready to assemble for home protection at a moments
notice.
This is an emergency -- this city is in peril -- and
those who have as yet found excuses for doing nothing,
who have not lifted a finger for the Confederacy, in any
way, have now the chance to show their pluck or coward 
ice, and he who falters now makes himself infamous for
all time (North Carolina State Archives 186 3g :1).
In response to this threat, Governor Vance "officially" o r 
dered the construction of breastworks
to be constructed in July of 1863.

and gun emplacements

There are many arguments

as to when the initial construction began.

According to an

article entitled "Our Defenses", which appeared in the A u g 
ust 22,

1863 edition of the Raleigh R e g i s t r a r , construction

of the fortifications began approximately in May of 1862.
It was

stated that

during the last 15 months immense labor has been b e 
stowed upon the permanent and temporary fortifications
of our city, and as common sense would dictate, atten 
tion was first bestowed upon the points which could
first be capable of strong resistance, or which were
most exposed to attack (North Carolina State Archives
186 3c :2) .
North Carolina and Virginia

formed a military agency

known as the Department of North Carolina and Virginia.
agency was begun in 1861 and was
of strategic

locations

The

concerned with the defense

in each state.

"The purpose of the
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department was not only to assist

in defending the area b e 

tween the James and Potomac rivers, but also to make ef fec 
tive the blockade of the coast of Virginia and North Carolina'’
(Spraggins

1941:163).

In order to prevent

Federal troops

from entering the states by way of the coast,

the construction

of fortifications with gun emplacements were needed.
defenses

Such

required a large manpower resource and being a p e r 

iod of war,

the states

did not have an available number of

white males to carry out the task.
relatively abundant and manual
Several months

later,

Blacks, however,

were

labor was not alien to them.

an act was passed that required all

slaves between the ages of 18 and 45 to register in the same
manner as the free black.
Upon requisition from the president of the Confederate
States, the government of Virginia would impress slaves
to work on fortifications and other labor necessary for
defense of the state.
No more than 10,000 could be used
for more than 60 days or 90 if locals refused to let
their slaves work.
Sixteen dollars a month was paid to
the master and the slave received soldier's rations,
medicine, e t c . All expenses were paid by the government
of the Confederate States of America (Spraggins 1941:173).
A similar mobilization of black labor existed in North
Carolina.

The most well-known fortifications were cons tru c

ted at Wilmington and involved the
2,000 slaves

(Figure

completed and Federal
Carolina,

11).

labor of approximately

After the fortifications had been

lines were moving deeper into North

Governor Vance stated in the January 4,

1865 e d i 

tion of the Weekly S t a n d a r d :
’
W hereas, the long expected attack upon our only remaining
seaport is now about to be made, and our state is also
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likely to be invaded at other points by an enemy to whom
mercy and civilization are alike unknown and unregarded;
whereas all the organized forces of the state already o r 
dered to the front may still be insufficient to roll back
the tide which threatens us from our doors, a fate horrible
to contemplate.
Now, therefore I Zebulon B. Vance Go ver
nor of the State of North Carolina, relying upon the loy
alty and devotion of her citizens, do issue this my p r o c 
lamation, commanding all good people, whether by law su b 
ject to military duty or not, who may be able to stand
behind breastwork and fire a musket, of all ages and c o n 
ditions, rally at once to the defence of their country
and hurry to Wilmington (North Carolina State Archives
1865 :3) .
Regardless

of V a n c e ’s bold speech, Wilmington eventually fell

into -Federal hands.
Three years before the fall of Wilmington,
construction had begun at Raleigh.

fortification

On December 20,

1862,

an

act was ratified that "authorized the Governor to employ slave
labor in erecting

fortifications and other works"

olina State Archives

1862:3).

As in Virginia,

(North Ca r

male slaves

between the ages of 18 and 45 were required to be available
for labor in the construction of defenses.
CONSTRUCTION OF THE RALEIGH FORTIFICATIONS
The construction of the Raleigh fortificat ions began
May of 1862.
ant

The engineering officer in charge was

Colonel Henry T. Guion.

Guion served with the

iment North Carolina State Troops
lina Artillery).
Major on April
to Lieutenant

13,

in

Lieuten
10th R e g 

(1st Regiment North

Car o

Me had risen from the rank of Captain to
1863 and five months

Colonel.

later was promoted

G u i o n ’s previous engineering e x p e r 

ience had been primarily in the eastern part of the state.
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Prior to his assignment at Raleigh, he directed the co n 
struction of the fieldworks at Greenville,

Goldsboro,

and

Fort Macon.
Lieutenant

Colonel Guion and his assistant superin 

tendent of works, James Holister, were allotted approx i
mately 263 slave and 23 free black laborers
Payroll records

indicate that the laborers

(Figure

12}.

came from 15

different North Carolina counties and each worked an av er 
age of 30 to 35 days

(Figure 13}.

The owners were paid

$1.00 a day per slave which they allowed to work.
records

Available

indicate cost of the labor totalled $8036.50

(Coker 19 66}.
Fifteen months of construction produced a ’’small ring
of earthworks” that extended approximately
1915:2}.
those

They were

of simple

referred to the works

"thrown up” around the city
relative simplicity,

(Olds

construction and typical of

adapted to mid-19th century warfare

himself,

four miles

(Figure

14}.

Guion,

in July of 1863 as being

(Coker 1966}.

Despite their

they .were not constructed in a h a p h a z 

ard manner.

The careful placement of limited works at st ra

tegic points

followed the traditional principles which guided

field fortification construction.

The application of these

principles was evident

in the construction of American

lutionary War defenses

and clearly guided the building of the

Confederate
of Raleigh.

defenses nearly
The

100 years

fortification plans

Re vo

later around the city
for Raleigh were briefly
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summarized in a local newspaper article entitled "Our D e 
fenses" which stated that
in so extensive a system of works it is difficult to
bring every portion up at once to the same standard of
strength; during the last 15 months immense labor has
been bestowed upon the permanent and temporary fortifi
cations of our city, and as common sense would dictate,
attention was first bestowed upon the points which could
be capable of strong resistance, or which were the most
exposed to attack.
The next thing to be done was to
connect these points, and the next to increase the cap
acity of defense of every part to the greatest possible
extent.
The second part of the work was long since
effected, and the third is now in steady progress, nor
do we expect that it will be suspended so long as the
enemy defer their attack, whether the delay be one month
or two years (North Carolina State Archives 1863c:2).
The type of fortification constructed at points, consid
ered most vulnerable to attack was the shelter trench.

The

construction of the trench at selected points was the first
stage in fortifying Raleigh.

As many as five separate trenches

were independently dug during the initial phases of construc
tion.

Although the simple trenches were

pits and provided minimal
a short period of time.
locations

cover,

little more than rifle

they could be constructed in

Simultaneous trenching at numerous

around the city insured proper defensive strength

for the primary stage of fortification construction.
The second phase of construction was the elaboration of
the shelter trench into more protective

forms of works.

were developed into half-closed parapets
emplacements.

According to Olds

(1915:2)

suitable

They

for gun

these were

strategi

cally placed around the city and were strengthened with t i m 
ber.

There were

18 such strengthened positions

and each had
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developed from a basic form of shelter trench.
five trenches and subsequent

gun emplacements

jor outward projections of the

The original
formed the uia-

fortification system.

Addi

tional gun emplacements were added during the third phase of
construct io n.'
Upon completion of the works
cations,

efforts

at the most

strategic

lo

concentrated on joining the defenses.

Trench

lines connected the major gun emplacements with smaller seco n
dary emplacements built into the line.
approximately eight feet wide and five
no ledge

The trenches were
feet deep.

There was

left at the base of the interior slope of the b r e a s t 

work and trench.

The stiff,

clayey soil of the piedmont

gion allowed this to be removed without
cation collapsing
breastwork,
flattened,

(Brackenbury

re

fear of the fortifi

1888:23).

The top of the

or its superior slope, was four feet wide and
as was

common

(Figure

15).

The flat surface fa c

ilitated the movement of workmen along the
well as aided the defender.

line of works as

The plane surface which topped

the breastwork enabled the defender to direct his

line of

fire toward the enemy without betraying his position.

The

fortifications we re constructed so that they would M look as
much as possible
hood,

like the natural ground in the n e i gh bor

so as to afford as bad a target as possible’’ (Brack

enbury

18 8 8:23).

Close examination indicates
influenced by several

factors.

that their placement

was

First, the defenses were

Figure 15. The top of the b re a s tw o rk

showing the trench line on the left

with a no ticeable drop in ele va tio n on the
(w e s te rn )

fa ce.

b re a s tw o rk 's outer
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designed to enclose as much of the North Carolina Railroad
as possible.

Of primary importance was

the protection of

the two railroad depots and associated warehouses.

The care

ful placement of the eastern and southern defenses allowed
the greatest distances possible between these defenses and
the storage/control areas.

Second, all the defenses were

constructed on high ground.

This is clearly evident when

the line of works is traced on a modern contour map of the
city

(Figure

16).

M a r y ’s College,

Landmarks

St.

and Dorthea Dix Hospital occupy land char 

acterized by a noticeable
their west

such as Devereau Meadow,

drop in elevation immediately to

-- outside the defended area.

A more dramatic drop in elevation is evident south of
the city.

The distinct

in this area supports
of gun emplacements
works

(Olds 1915:2).

advantage of defending high ground

the reasoning behind the concentration

in the south/southeast extension of the
A third factor which influenced the

strategic placement of major segments of the defenses was
the probable direction from which the city would be attacked.
It was apparent early in the war that the Federals would
attempt to capture the port

city of Wilmington and take

gradual control of the entire North Carolina coast.
eral

forces became more

region,
ior.
it was

As Fed

firmly established in the coastal

raiding parties would infiltrate the state's

inter

With raids on a number of eastern North Carolina towns,
logical to assume that

Raleigh would be a prime target.
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V ERTICAL

DATUM
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1929

A contour map of the city of Raleigh, North Carolina. The stippled
area within the circle locates the segment of fortifications identified
in the 1936 Federal Writer's Project and examined in this research.
The fortification segment lies immediately east of the Downtown
Boulevard.
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Therefore,

close attention to the placement of the eastern

and southern defenses was

imperative.

They were extended

to prevent quick access to the city by way of the major roads.
Allowing adequate

distance between these defenses and the

economic sectors of the city was a major concern.

Ex ami na

tion of the structural aspects typical of the Raleigh d e 
fenses

can best be seen in surviving remnants

(Figure

17).

Perhaps the most well-preserved section of the fortifications
is located adjacent to the tracks of the Seaboard Coast Line
in the northern extension
works was
It was

(Figures

18 and 19).

This

line of

first studied in a 1936 Federal W r i t e r ’s Project.

reported in a local newspaper in reference to this

project and this particular section of works that
The clearly perceptible earthworks abudding on the west
side of North Blount Street, a few hundred feet south
east of the three story community house of Pilot Mills,
may be taken as a starting point for tracing the line
of the fortifications.
Following Blount Street north
to the railroad tracks and turning southwest across the
track and open ground a few hundred feet to the edge of
of the wood and following the clearly defined embankment
about 400 yards to the bridge on Fairview Road across
from Pigeon House Branch.
These two sections of old
breastworks are about one fourth of a mile apart, and
between them no connecting link is now perceptible
(North Carolia
State Archives 1936:1).
The 1936 investigation
with

less perceptible

of the city.

located these two major extensions
remnants

found extending to the south

Of the two extensions

mains clearly discernable today.

identified,

only one re 

It is the network that

runs

adjacent to the railroad and Downtown Boulevard and extends
to the bridge on Fairview Road

(Figure 20).

Figure 17. R etracing of the C o n fed erate defenses on a current city map
of Raleigh, North Carolina.

Figure 18. View of

the wooded area in which

the northern fortification

network is located . The trac ks of the S eaboard Coast Line
run north/south on top of the ridge evident in the background.

Figure 19. Most clearly discernable remnant of the northern fortifications
a d jacent to

to the Downtown Boulevard.

Figure 20. The Downtown Boulevard as seen from
the northern fortifications.

the main trench line in
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The

line of works was

constructed on the side of a

natural hill and elevated approximately 27 feet above
immediately to the west

(Figures 21 and 22).

land

The principal

concern in planning this section was the utilization of high
ground in the defense of the Raleigh and Gaston Railroad.
Proper defensive

strength in this area was important

itoring the transport

of troops and supplies

in m o n 

into and out of

the city.
The northern defenses were

strengthened by the constru c

tion of a series of rifle or shelter pits
below the main trench line
main trench

in front of and

(Figures 23 and 24).

line was approximately eight

Whereas the

feet wide and five

feet deep, the pits were dug one and one-half to two feet deep
and placed behind a small, eighty-three
breastwork.
rifle pits

Although it was
independent

foot

long east/west

common practice to keep the

of each other as an outer defense,

joining the pits by means of the breastwork strengthened the
flank protection offered by the works.
were

Because the pits

located only one hundred forty feet to the north of

and somewhat perpendicular to the main trench,
between the works was adequate.

communication

Hence, the rifle pits could

be easily abandoned for the main defense

(Figure 25).

As previously stated, the Raleigh fortifications were
first constructed at strategic points around the city and
gradually connected as available time and labor permitted.
Maximum simplicity in design was achieved by strengthening

Downtown Boulevard.

Figure 21. Plan view of northern fortifications identified in the 1936 Federal Writer's Project and adjacent to the

Profile A-A'

Breastwork

Trench

P r o file

P r o file

S S'

C-C
0______ feet

30

Figure 22. Contour map of a segment of the northern fortifications identified in the
1936 Federal Writer's Project.

Figure 23. Rifle pits constructed immediately north of and below the main
trench line in the northern fo rtifica tio n s. Note the railroad cars
of the Seaboard Coast Line in the background.

Figure 24. Rifle pits co n stru cted

immediately north of and below the

main trench line in the northern fortifications.

Figure 25. View of the main trench line as seen from the ridge above
and behind the fortifications.
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those points most

capable of strong resistance.

Trench

lines

connected these points and were extended to incorporate areas
vulnerable to attack.
gun emplacements

on high ground and thus provided strong de 

fensible positions.
the works,

They were strategically placed with

In addition to the careful placement of

the Raleigh fortifications,

fenses of Philadelphia, were

like the American d e 

constructed with the und er sta nd

ing that unnecessary elaboration in fortification does not
lead to the success of the work nor can it stop a determined
enemy.
CIVILIAN REACTION TO THE RALEIGH FORTIFICATIONS
Prior to the completion of the

fortifications,

the

citizens of Raleigh were reassured that effective measures
were being taken to protect their city from Federal
In August of 1863,
tenant

raids.

General Joseph Johnston inspected Li e u 

Colonel Guion's

the Raleigh Registrar

defensive works.

It was reported in

’’that the strong and weak points of

our defenses have been closely scanned by the
eye of the commanding General,

and provisions made

promptly strengthening such parts as requires
olina State Archives

intelligent

it"

for
(North Car

1863c:2).

In addition to the high level of planning that went
the construction of such an "extensive

system of works” a

movement was under way to organize the civilian
of the city into a home guard.

into

inhabitants

The attitude of the population

during the last phase of construction of the fortifications
was that "every citizen of Raleigh able to bear a r m s , and
large numbers

of citizens

from other points who have te n d e r 

ed their services, will man these entrenchments"

(North C a r 

olina State Archives

14,

1863e:l).

a large number of citizens

On Tuesday, July

1863,

gathered at the courthouse where

Governor Vance was present and explained the object of
the meeting.
In the course of his remarks, he entered
into the details of the means of the defense within his
power.
It was announced to the meeting, and amid loud
applause, that the cadets of the Hillsboro Military
Academy had volunteered their services in any emergency
to defend the city; also that the employees of the North
Carolina Railroad had organized themselves into a co m 
pany for the same purpose (North Carolina State Archives
186 5b :3) .
A meeting had been held at the same location several days
earlier and it also concerned the
means of placing the city in a state of defence against
Yankee raids.
The meeting was addressed by Governor
Vance and Ex-Governor Bragg, after which there was an
enrollment of a large number of names for service, either
in the cavalry, artillery or infantry branch of the se r
vice.
Every man in Raleigh who can do duty will, we are
sure, do so if the emergency requires it, and we feel
very sure that if Yankee thieves come here after wool,
they will go back shorn (North Carolina State Archives
1863f :1) .
There was growing concern among the citizens

of Raleigh

that the capital would soon be attacked by the Pederals.
saw,

North Carolina had been raided on July

Mount on the 29th of the same month.

War

8, 1863 and Rocky

The enemy,

it was said,

saved nothing .
Whatever is valuable, that can be carried off, they steal;
what cannot be removed, they destroy.
Mills, graineries,
cattle, horses, slaves, provisions of all kinds -- even .
agricultural implements; what may be of most importance
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to our people ^ or the destruction of which would cause
the most suffering, seem to be the objects at which
their efforts are chiefly directed... (North Carolina
State Archives 18 6 3d :2 3 .
Descriptions of such warfare tactics were
Raleigh newspapers
to home,

commonplace

in

in 1864-1865 and as the war grew closer

they served with other articles to instill hatred

and fear into the people, while at the same time reaffirming
the defensive measures taken to protect the community
ure 26).
Atlanta,

Citizens "prepared for the fate which had befallen
Savannah,

Columbia,

captured by Sherman"

(Yates

and other cities which had been
194 1:32 7).

march through the south is evident
ments.

(Fig

11i s policy in his

in several of his

st ate 

Me concluded that

until we can repopulate Georgia, it is useless to occupy
it; but the utter destruction of the roads, houses and
people will cripple their military r esou rc es ... I can
make the march, and make Georgia howl (Sherman quoted
from Fuller 1961:108).
He stated with regard to South Carolina that
we are not only fighting hostile armies, but a hostile
people, and must make old and young, rich and poor, feel
the hard hand of w a r . .. The truth is the whole army is
burning with an insatiable desire to wreak vengeance
upon South Carolina.
I almost tremble at her fate
(Sherman quoted from Fuller 1961:109).
The route of his march into North Carolina and towards
the capital, was predicted by several Confederate
"Generals Beauregard, Johnston,

Hardee,

generals.

Moke, Hampton,

Wheeler assembled their forces thinking that perhaps
could be defended"

(Yates

1941:326).

and

Raleigh

The prospect of such a

stand grew dim as Sherman's troops advanced rapidly.

"Cover-

Figure 26.*The Southern viewpoint* as depicted by the artist
John Adalbert Volck (Angle 1967).
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nor Vance asked General Johnston what was the best thing to
do and he replied -- that he should make the best terms he
could for the protection of the capital city and its people"
(Yates 1941:327)
...General Johnston had given Governor Vance notice of
his intention to uncover Raleigh, so that such p r e p a r a 
tion as could be made to meet the emergency had been
finished.
A vast amount of state property had been r e 
moved to various places along the North Carolina R a i l 
road, mainly to Graham, Greensboro, and Salisbury, in
cluding blankets, clothing, overcoats, English cloth
enough for 100,000 uniforms, 10,000 pair of shoes, great
quantities of cotton cloth, yarns, cotton cards, bacon,
corn, medical stores, 6,000 scythe blades, together with
the public records, Vance and the other state officers
having worked day and night so that before noon on April
12, everything had been shipped (Olds 1915:2).
Governor Vance took the advice of General Johnston and
on April

12 , 1865 , sent S u r g e o n -General Edward Warren,

Jason Burr,

and Majo-r John Devereaux by train to meet with

General Sherman.
federate

The train, however, was stopped by the

Con 

forces of General Hampton and was ordered by the

General to return to Raleigh.
tion and, before
troops.

Colonel

The train reversed its d ire c

reaching Raleigh,

The representatives

was stopped by Federal

of the governor were escorted

to Clayton where they met with Sherman.

They conveyed the

g o v e r n o r Ts request that the city be spared and that a p e a c e 
ful transition of authority take place.

Sherman assured the

individuals that the governor's wishes would be respected as
long as no resistance was met.
At sunrise of a cloudy day, April 13, 1865, a "cortege"
for the city rode out of Raleigh to meet Sherman.
Its
mission was to formally surrender the capital.
In the
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carriage were R a l e i g h ’s mayor and a few other leading
citizens.
One of them, riding in the seat with the
driver, carried a stick with a white cloth tied to its
tip.
He planted the surrender symbol above the empty
fortifications and the group waited in the rain until
eight o ’clock that morning when, through fieldglasses ,
Sherman's advanced cavalry came into sight [Waugh 196 7:82) .
The town was quiet as his troops marched in.
self remained only briefly.

Sherman h i m 

Before his departure to Durham,

he ordered three of his men to destroy Whitaker's Mill.

This

was the only destruction that took place and "on the whole,
the frightened little
1941:331).

city was scarcely touched"

For the citizens of Raleigh,

(Yates

the War was over.

CHAPTER IV
MAXIMUM BENEFIT THROUGH MINIMAL EFFORT
Research on the Confederate

defenses

around Raleigh

provides not only an historical account of their construc
tion but

considerable

insight into their practical value as

a means of protecting the city.

The primary goal in this

research is to evaluate the fortification system based on
the efficiency of its construction in relation to the g e n 
eral type of warfare practiced during the
of the Civil War.

last three years

Prior to this evaluation,

a discussion

of efficient action will clarify the relationship between
this field of study and fortification construction around
the city
EFFICIENT ACTION AND THE PRINCIPLE OF LEAST EFFORT
Efficient

construction with effective

basic engineering goals

results were two

in field fortification construction.

In order to better understand these goals and their a p pl ic a
bility to the defensive works of Raleigh, a discussion of
efficient

action is appropriate.

’’The

action, whatever the field of activity,
formance

or a gigantic undertaking,

praxiology"

(Skolimowski

1965:349).
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science of efficient
a one minute p e r 

lias received the name of
It is a science based on
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the study of practical values;

values temporarily divorced

from those of a moral or aesthetic nature.

"Praxiology is

concerned with establishing norms of efficient action,

and

also with evaluating the efficiency of performed actions.
It is a normative

discipline'’ (Skolimowski

1965:355).

The science of praxiology had its formal beginning
the early 20th century with the writings
philosopher Tadeusz Kotarbinski.
and A Treatise on Good Work
in shaping the discipline

of the Polish

His Practical Essays

and Espinas

as a science.

Earlier attempts

such as Dunoyer' (1845),

(1897) .

(1913)

(1955) were major contributions

establishing a general theory for efficient
pursued by writers

in

at

action had been
Bourdear

(1882),

While these scholars contributed to this

particular aspect of human action,

Kotarbinski is largely

credited with developing praxiology to its current

state.

The method of praxiological study is based on the a n a l y 
sis of practical values, that

is, values of efficient action.

One such value is the economization of human mental and
physical energy.
approaches

Skolimowski

(1965:355)

are often taken to minimize the expenditure

energy and are evident

in a variety of actions.

struction of the Raleigh fortifications,
mized the potential

of

The c o n 

for example, m i n i 

impact of the Federal cavalry on the

economic sectors of the city.
fications

notes that several

The construction of the

on high ground at strategic locations

connection of the works,

forti

and subsequent

created angles of fire too great
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to allow a successful attack.

As a consequence,

the Raleigh

defenders occupied an advantageous position compelling Fe d
eral raiders to occupy a disadvantageous position.

The

Federals would have needed three times the number of in d i 
viduals manning the entrenchments to equal the advantage
afforded the defenders

from their fortified positions.

Hence,

the Federals would have expended considerably more energy in
attacking the city than the Confederates

in defending it.

Skolimowski points out that the economization of energy
is also achieved by ’’replacing physical efforts by r e fl ec
tion” (1965:355).

Lieutenant

Colonel Guion and his staff of

engineers minimized unnecessary physical efforts by utilizing
established principles

and techniques of field fortification

construction.

defensive plan for Raleigh focused on

Guion's

the implementation of defensive

strategies and tactics

in his

fortification design while adhering to the principle of sim
plification of procedure.

His " m et ho d” or approach to the

construction of the defenses was synonymous with what S k o l i 
mowski

describes

as "system of act ion” which refers to a way

of performing a complex action.

The action is well-planned

and "can be systematically applied and consists

in the proper

selection and composition of the elements of the action”
( 1965:35 7) .
If a system of action is carefully planned,
expenditure

then the

of human energy will be minimized and the p r o b 

able success of the activity enhanced.

The degree of sue-
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cess is dependent on an increase

in effectiveness although

some losses occur in order to attain more

substantial gains

(Skol imowski 1966:377).
A great deal of insight

into technological progress can

be achieved through the application of the praxiological
model.

This requires that the researcher of a specific

branch of learning examine the "pattern of thinking" within
that discipline.
Specific branches of learning originate and condition
specific modes of thinking and adhere to categories
through which they can best express their content and
by means of which they can further progress (Skolimow
ski 1966 :3 78) .
For example,

surveyors think in terms of accuracy;

tural engineers,

in terms

of strength;

marily in terms of aesthetics.

struc

and architects,

pri

Military engineers think of

fortification as the utilization and transformation of n a 
ture to maximize the advantages of strong defensive position.
Regardless of the discipline,

technical

development

is m e a 

sured by attempts to maximize effectiveness while minimizing
effort.

Zipf

(1949:1)

states that a

person in solving his immediate problems will view these
against the background of his probable future problems,
as estimated by himself.
Moreover, he will strive to
solve his problems in such a way as to minimize the t o 
tal work that he must expend in solving both his immed
iate problems and his probable future p r o b l e m s . That
in turn means that the person will strive to minimize
the probable average rate of his work-expenditure over
t ime .
The success of the

fortification plan for Raleigh was cont in

gent upon the action having certain characteristics.

Guion*s
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design showed a high degree of feasibility,
flexibility,
laborers made

and maximum simplicity.

A continuous supply of

feasible the construction of extensive works.

Construction of the fortifications
strategic

inner harmony,

in stages at the most

locations around the city insured proper defensive

strength without unnecessary elaboration.

The subsequent

connection of the strategic points with simple
tablished the works

as a complete

trenches e s 

fortification network.

The

strengthened positions and connecting trenches were mutually
supportive and hence,

reduced the possibility of failure

in

any part of the defensive plan.
The simple

design of the Raleigh fortifications m i n i 

mized the amount of human energy necessary to construct
and enhanced their probable success
however,

against attack.

Success,

was also dependent on maximizing the effectiveness

of an extensive

fortification system.

of the defensive network was essential
numerous

them

defense rallies,

of the civilian populace.

The proper management
and, as suggested by

required the active participation
Although the fortifications

the complexity of more advanced forms of fieldworks,
carefully planned system of action by which they were
structed allowed adequate

defense

lacked

the
co n

for the city and its i n 

habitants .
" V A N C E fS FOLLY" ?
Governor Vance's

decision to begin construction on

fortifications around the city of Raleigh in May of 1862
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was an attempt to counter the impact of potential Federal
cavalry raids on the economic sectors

of the city.

decision was backed by strong public support

His

in Raleigh and

agreeable to many North Carolinians who were to supply slave
laborers

from counties across

the state.

The first year of

construction passed without incident and after fourteen months
of construction,

the fortification network neared completion.

During the month of July,
completion of the works
miles

1863,

however,

in August,

just prior to the

a town less than fifty

from the capital was attacked by Federal raiders.

The

severity of the damage spawned numerous

appeals among the i n 

habitants of Raleigh to organize a home

defense.

Several p u b 

lic meetings were held in which "there was an enrollment of a
large number of names

for service,

either in the cavalry,

ar

tillery,

or infantry branch of s e r vi ce ” (North Carolina State

Archives

1863f:lj.

the pledges

Despite the enthusiasm of the rallies and

of support from citizens

of the North Carolina Railroad,
was questionable.

The male

such as the employees

the success of the meetings

inhabitants of the city and s u r 

rounding area were criticized in the days

following the m e e t 

ings because of their failure to seriously organize and p r e 
pare

for the threat that the city and its inhabitants

faced.

Although it was acknowledged prior to the completion of the
fortifications

that "cavalry raids are getting to be serious

things to the people of the Confederacy
quiet

inhabitants of the goodly city..."

-- especially to the
(North Carolina State
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Archives

1863g:l),

bodied citizens
population was

successful attempts to organize able-

for home

defense did not materialize.

content to react to an attack on the city

only when and "if the emergency requires
State Archives

The

it"

(North Carolina

1863f:l).

In response to the public attitude,
addressed the issue in a direct manner.

local newspapers
It was bluntly

stated that
This is an emergency -- this city is in peril -- and
those who have as yet found excuses for doing nothing,
who have not lifted a finger for the Confederacy, in
any way, have now the chance to show their pluck or
cowardice, and he who falters now makes himself infam
ous for all time (North Carolina State Archives 186 3g :1).
On July

15,

1863,

an article

appeared in the Raleigh Registrar

and was directed more specifically "TO THE MEN OF RALEIGH".
Men of Raleigh, read the letter of the Kinston cor respon
dent of the State Journal and say what you are doing for
the protection of your homes.
True, a large number of
hands are working on your defenses, but where is the o r 
ganization for manning them?
Where is the cavalry com
pany for scouting and bringing in the earliest intelli
gence of the whereabouts and movements of the enemy?
Wake up, wake up, unless you prefer depredation and o u t 
rage to a manly defense of your lives and property
(North Carolina State Archives 1863a:2).
This was followed on the 21st of the same month by another
article which stated that "Ditching will not save us but a
vigilant home organization will"
chives

18 6 3 h :1) .

of Raleigh against

These

(North Carolina State A r 

sentiment s suggest that the defense

Federal raids was partly dependent

on

the active participation and organization of the civilian
population.

Contrary to the optimism expressed in local
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defense meetings,

the inhabitants had increased fear of

impending doom in 1863.
and the inevitable

Economic conditions had worsened

fate of the Confederacy and the city was

apparent.
Attempts to organize a local defensive

force,

r eg ar d

less of its success, was a response to the serious threat
faced by the inhabitants of the city.
functioned not only to organize

and mobilize a defensive

force but also to reduce the high
certainty in the population.
and Altner

(1969),

The public rallies

level of stress and u n 

According to Chappie

(1970)

the regular gathering and interaction of

civilians not only reduced their level of anxiety but e n 
couraged differences of opinion to be resolved.

" M o biliz a

tion,

by the threat of attack or its actual occurence,

turbs

all and is the strongest of unifiers.

di s 

It Intensifies

the emotional-interactional patterns of conflicts..."
(Chappie

1970 :307).

In contrast to the high level of organization and p l a n 
ning in the construction of the Raleigh fortifications,

the

organization and implementation of local civilian defensive
measures

in the city were poorly coordinated and lacked i m 

plementation.

The

fortifications,

military effort using slave
years

largely the result

laborers, were

unmanned for two

following their completion in August

of 1863 and were

abandoned upon the approach of Sherman's
1865

of a

(Waugh

1967:82).

forces

in April of

During this period of time, and for

several years
habitants

following the surrender of the city, many i n 

of Raleigh referred to the entrenchments

as "Vance

Folly" because "the war governor was held responsible
them"

(Briggs 1936:1).

The governor was accused of lacking

a good sense of foresight
extensive

for

in ordering the construction of an

system of works that were never to be used.

CONCLUSION
The fortifications

of Raleigh were constructed in a

very efficient manner by an experienced and competent e n 
gineering officer in the

Confederate States Army.

His c o n 

struction techniques were well-established prior to their
application in the defensive works at Raleigh and based on
principles utilized at Philadelphia eighty-three years
earlier in the American Revolution.
The basic principles

of fortification construction

common in the building of defensive works during the Re v o 
lution and the Civil War were based on maximizing the e f 
fectiveness

of the fieldworks while minimizing the efforts

required to construct them.
tions

The construction of fortifica

in stages allowed the simplest

the most strategic locations

forms to be built at

and then gradually developed

into more substantial works as available time and labor p e r 
mitted.

The utilization of natural

ground,

and the concealment of works

ment

increased the advantages

One of the primary tenets

topography,
in the

such as high

local env ir on

offered by fortified positions

in fieldwork design was

limited

65

construction void of unnecessary elaboration.
painfully

learned by many

ignored by some

(Bailey 1983:122)

(Mitchell 1968:14),

fication were vital considerations
construction.

Although

and completely

limitation and si mp li 
in field fortification

Such considerations were important

became more professional, weapons more accurate,

as soldiers
and strat 

egies and tactics more diverse.
The Raleigh fortifications were primarily built to
counter the advantages

afforded Federal raiders

skirmish attacks against the city.
by swift,

calculated attacks

base of cities and towns.
strategy in Federal

Raids were characterized

directed against the economic

By 1863, they were an important

campaigns to defeat the south.

in all its reality, was taken to the people and,
not directly inflicted upon the citizens
an inevitable

fate.

Warfare,

although

of Raleigh,

seemed

Fortification construction was a p r a c 

tical response to a very real threat.

The organization and

active participation of the civilian population,
also essential

in potential

however,

was

in combating the type of warfare waged against

the city and its inhabitants.
The citizens of Raleigh and the surrounding area did
not react to the threat that

faced the city until the d e 

fenses neared completion in the summer of 1863.
dence

indicates or suggests

No e v i 

that the white civilian in hab 

itants of Raleigh directly participated in the construction
of the works nor did they effectively organize a citizenry
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military force during the thirteen months prior to their
completion.
defensive

Although the effective organization of a local

force was never established,

held during the month of July 1863,
public fear,

confusion,

the numerous

transformed a period of

and indifference

into public unity.

The meetings temporarily reduced the high

level of anxiety

brought on by a depressed economy, the inevitable
the Confederacy,

rallies

defeat of

and the approach of General S h e r m a n ’s forces.

The abandonment of the fortifications

in 1865 was not

due to the citiz en s’ failure to properly organize and i m 
plement

a local defense plan.

The utilization of such a

force would have been effective
against the offensive
the defensive works

launched by General Sherman.

around the city were simple

and limited in strength.
ferred little advantage
termined enemy.

against a raid but not
Likewise,

in nature

They were not siege works

and of-

against a major offensive by a de

Sherman, not

fully aware of their

limited

strength and informed of Governor V a n c e ’s call for batteries
of artillery to be sent to the city

(Olds

1915:2),

stated

in a dispatch to General Kilpatrick
I will push all the columns straight on RALEIGH.
I do
not care about RALEIGH now, but want to defeat and d e s 
troy the Confederacy.
Bo not break the railway between
here and RALEIGH as we want the rails up to that city
(Sherman quoted from Olds 1915:2).
The

fate of Raleigh was determined not only by Sherman but

by General Johnston and Governor Vance.

It was acknowledged
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by all three

individuals that the survival of the city

and its inhabitants was dependent on the abandonment
all Confederate
sistance

resistance,

of

including the symbols of r e 

such as the fortification network around the city.
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APPENDIX

The following photographs

are of remnants of the

northern extension of the Civil War fortifications around
Raleigh,

North Carolina.

They are located on the eastern

side of the Downtown Boulevard and adjacent to the tracks
of the Seaboard Coast Line.

Their precise

found in the description provided in the
Project of 1936

(Figures

16 and 17).

location is

Federal W r i t e r ’s

S o u t h w e s t vi ew of the main t re nch line in the northernmost fo rti fic at io ns .
N ot e the rise in el e v a t i o n to the e a s t ( l e f t ) with a no ti ce ab le drop in elevation
to the w e s t (right).

V i e w of t h e m a i n t r e n c h line l o o k i n g n o r t h in t h e n o r t h e r n m o s t f o r t i f i c a t i o n s .

N o r t h w e s t v i e w of t h e m a in t r e n c h line in t h e n o r t h e r n f o r t i f i c a t i o n s .

N o r t h e r n v i e w of t h e ma in t r e n c h line in t h e n o r t h e r n m o s t f o r t i f i c a t i o n s .

V iew

of t h e m ai n t r e n c h line a s s e e n f r o m b e h i n d t h e n o r t h e r n m o s t f o r t i f i c a t i o n s .

N o r t h e r n m o s t r e m n a n t o f t h e m a i n t r e n c h line in t h e n o r t h e r n f o r t i f i c a t i o n s .

E a s t e r n v i e w of the hillside behind th e m aj or b r e a s t w o r k in the n o r t h e r n m o s t
fortifications.

V i e w of the main trench line in the northern fo rti fic at io ns . Note the immediate
drop in ele vat io n in front ( w e s t ) of the main b r e a s tw o r k .

A n o t i c e a b l e c h a n g e in th e s i z e and height of

th e b r e a s t w o r k in the

n o r t h e r n f o r t i f i c a t i o n s s u g g e s t s t h a t th e pos iti on may h a v e been the
lo c a t io n of a gun e m p l a c e m e n t . R e f e r to the l o c a t i o n of th e site on
the C o n f e d e r a t e plan of the w o r k s (F ig ur e 13).

E r o s io n on the o u t e r ( w e s t e r n ) f a c e of the main b r e a s t w o r k in the
northern fortifications.
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